North East Journal of Legal Studies
Volume 2 Spring 1994

Article 10

Spring 1994

A Conservative literalist- Justice Scalia's legal Philosophy As Seen
Through Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and Texas v.
johnson
Walter E. Joyce

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/nealsb

Recommended Citation
Joyce, Walter E. (1994) "A Conservative literalist- Justice Scalia's legal Philosophy As Seen Through
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and Texas v. johnson," North East Journal of Legal Studies:
Vol. 2 , Article 10.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/nealsb/vol2/iss1/10
This item has been accepted for inclusion in DigitalCommons@Fairfield by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@Fairfield. It is brought to you by DigitalCommons@Fairfield with permission from the rightsholder(s) and is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this item in any way that is
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses, you need to obtain
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license
in the record and/or on the work itself. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@fairfield.edu.

].40

141

A CONSERVATIVE LITERALIST - JUSTICE SCALIA'S LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY AS SEEN THROUGH
AUSTIN V. MICHIGAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND
TEXAS V. JOHNSON
BY
WALTER E. JOYCE*
Introduction
save for the abortion issue, no case in recent
years
has caused such a public furor as Texas v.
Johnson 105 L.Ed.2,342. There, of course, the Court
said in an opinion by Justice Brennan that the State
of Texas' interest in preventing breaches of the
peace did not support its conviction of Johnson who
burned the American flag as part of a peaceful
political protest demonstration. The court concluded
there was no threat to the peace of the community.
In addition Brennan wrote:
"Nor does the State's
interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of
nationhood and national unity justify his crimina l
conviction for engaging in political expression".
(105 L.Ed.2,364)
The
anger and hostility toward the Court
expresse d by public officials, the acrimonious debate
over whether a Constitutional amendment was needed
to right such a "wrong decisionn, the passage of
a federal statute prohibiting desecration of the
national symbol, the anguished outcry by patriotic
groups,
and
the
confusion,
exasperation
and
frustration expressed by ordinary citizens have just
begun
to
subside,
despite
the recent decision
declaring unconstitu\ional the new federal statute
to ban "flagburning" , by the same majority of the
Supreme Court and the defeat in the House of the
proposed constitutional amendment.
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This public outcry was accompanied by the
astonishment
of
conservatives,
liberals
and
professional court watchers at the makeup of the
majority in both "flagburning" decisions.
For there
lo and behold were not only the new Justice Kennedy
but Justice Antonin Scalia, joining Justl'ce William
Brennan's majority opinion. The two Reagan appoi ntees
had broken with the "conservative bloc" and had joined
the "liberal" bloc's intellectual leader.
Shock
and dismay abounded, with particular attention given
to Scalia. For here was a man called by some "worse
than Bork" 2 , and whose record seemed to support those
who questioned his position on cases involving the
Bill of Rights.
This paper focuses on one recent case in the
just completed term in an attempt to discover whether
the Justice's position in Texas v. Johnson and the
latest flagburning case are disparate from his
jurisdictional bent.
The Justice
Although he has served but four terms, Scalia
has already made an imprint on the court.
An
independent thinker, a man
a
a
loner, an intellectual gadfly , a Just1ce pursu1ng
his own consistent intellectual agenda, he is one
" whose constitutional · theory and personal identity
fuse. • • •
the
willing
servant
of
a
particular
c ulturally induced interpretive world view and the
carrier of lessons about what it means to approach
the unruly world of constitutional
though it were amenable to such
control.
In the 1988 term he wrote the fewest opinions
for the Court
<1fl but by all odds the most
concurrences ( 23)
His voting alignment patterns
in the same term was predictable:
Kennedy
Rehnquist
White
O'Connor
Stevens
Brennan
Marshall

85%

82%
78%
76%
59%

54%
54%

Legislative history does not particularly concern

143

142

him and precedent does not have the highest priority
in statutory or constitutional interpretation. Rather
he is a textualist, a positivist, a formalist who
sees the text often independent of historical or
contemporary
context.
Perhaps,
as
Kanmar
has
suggested, his scholastic training bas so moulded
his intellectual apparatus that words themselves,
logic, and verbal jousting, become central to his
thought processes.
"I adhere to the ·text where the text is clear.
Where the text leaves room for interpretation I
am guided
in what it means by our
societal
traditions, not by a show of handg.
Hey,
maybe
I don't like the result either."
Thus Scalia,
in First Amendment cases, looks at the text to arrive
at its ·" plain meaning" and then interprets it in
terms of traditional societal values rather than
taking the "absolute" approach as did his great
predecessor Hugo Black, whose constitutional world
was rationalized and supported in terms of historical
evidence to a greater extent than Scalia's.
Both men are positivists and textualists but
Black was content to rely on just the text. · Scalia
on the other hand, despite his reliance on strict
textual discipline, would depart from Black on issues
like obscenity and cases involving national security,
such as the Pentagon Papers case, and, if his record
on the D.C. circuit is any indication, in libel cases
as well.
In other words, Justice Scalia is no civil
libertarian.
Nor is he a closet liberal in First
Amendment speech issues.
Rather as this analysis
of the rece.n t case will point out, where there is
no conflict with the text and his definition of
traditional values and his coherent rational approach
to the law, Scalia will go along with the text and
let the chips fall where they may.
Socioeconomic
and
political
issues
are
irrelevant; the words and their implied values are
determinative.
Scalia exhibits neither the pragmatic
skepticism of a Holmes nor the positive absolutism
of a Black.
He may come to the same conclusion as
those legal giants but that result fits into a neat,
logical system of jurisprudence and that system
emphasizes the textual definition of value.
Thus
in the case to be discussed, the majority deals with
such issues as corporate wealth, the interests of
minority stockholders, the size of corporations,
the impact of that economic power on political debate
and how all this relates to a state statute limiting
the amounts corporations may spend in political
debate.
True to his philosophy, Scalia treats all

this as unimportant· to the issue of the meaning of
the First Amendment in the particular case. Scalia
considers merely the value and meaning of the First
Amendment, not the realpolitique of the situation.
The case
To illustrate Justice Scalia's philosophy and
constitutional approach on the speech clause of the
First Amendment, this paper will
the recent
case in the 1989-90 term of Ausrin vs. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce 108 L Ed. 2 652.
There, Michigan
p'rohibited a corporation from using its funds for
independent
expenditures
in
support
of
or
in
opposition to any candidate in election for state
office.
The
statute
defined
an
independent
expenditure as one not made at the direction or under
the control of another person, or to a committee
working for or against a candidate. The law allowed
corporations to make such independent expenditures
from only segregated funds used solely for political
purposes.
The statute specifically exempted the
media.
The defendant in the case was a non-profit
corporation whose membership consisted of both profit
and
non-profit
corporations
with
the
former
constituting 75% of the membership.
All members
contributed annual dues.
The Chamber of Commerce
sought to use its general treasury for a newspaper
advertisement in favor of a specific candidate for
the Michigan House of Representatives.
The Federal
District Court held the statute valid under the First
Amendment and under the equal protection clause of
the 14th.
However the Sixth Circuit reversed on
these grounds:
1.
The Chamber was founded to disseminate
economic and political ideas and it considered itself
a non-traditional corporation.
2.
Its expenditures did not
appearance of corruption.

pose a

3.
There was no compelling state
justifying infringement of free speech.

threat or
interest

In an opinion by Justice Marshall the Supreme
Court reversed.
Marshall was joined by his usual
confederates - Justices Brennan, Blackman and Stevens
and in addition by two so called "conservative",
members, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White.
This unusual grouping shows the inherent danger of
attempting
to
label
justices
as
liberal
or
conservative
and
to
predict
voting
patterns.
Rehnqui st seldom, if ever, votes with the "liberal"
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wing on First Amendment issues 1 whil:e White, though
more of a swing vote 1 tends to view issues very
narrowly, including those cases involving the first
amendment.
So divided was the Court here that in
addition to the dissenting opinion written by Justice
Kennedy for himself and Justices O'Connor and Scalia 1
there were three concurring opinions by Brennan 1
Stevens and Scalia.
The
Court's
opinion
noted
that
Michigan
identified as a
serious danger the significant
possibility that corporate political expenditures
could undermine the integrity of the political process
and had implemented a narrowly tailored solution
to that problem.
"By requiring corporations to make
all independent political expenditures through a
separate fund made up of money solicited expressly
for political purposes the statute reduces the threat
that huge corporate treasuries amassed with the aid
of favorable state laws will be gtsed to influence
unfairly the outcome of elections."
Thus the State
through this statute allowed corporations to express
their political vie\ITS while carefully eliminating
the distortion that might be caused by corporate
spending.
The Court emphasized that the Act was
.. precisely targeted" to eliminate what it considered
to be a legitimate state interest, i.e., the danger
to political discourse. The majority concluded that
"although
we agree
that expression rights
are
implicated in this case we hold that the Act is
Constitutional because the provision is
tailored to serve a compelling state interest."
Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia disputed both the issues of a
compelling state interest and the need to narrowly
draw any limits on freedom of speech.
The opinion
is vintage Scalia
combative, colorful, pungent,
independent, argumentative, appealing to the textual
literalness of the First Amendment, scornful of the
majority's attempt to refine a limitation on free
speech and unwilling to consider that it is in
society's
interest to promote "fair" political
debate.
. As is so often the case with dissenting
and concurring opinions, there is a tendency to
overstate
("Orwellian Censorship")
since one is
writing for oneself and appealing to a future day
when the Court's opinion might be overruled.
"I dissent", states Scalia 1 because "Government,
cannot be trusted to assure 1 through censorship,
the
fairness
of
political
debate.
This
is
incompatible with the absolutely central truth of

the first amendment • • • • • The object of the law we
have approved today is root to prevent wrong doing
but to prevent speech. 11 1
While not quoting Hugo
Black or using Black's "absolute" approach Scalia
comes very close to his position at least as far
as political discourse in its rational form is
cc:mcerned.
..The Michigan statute is incompatible
w1th
the 11 unrepealable
wisdom
of
our
First
Amendment. 11
There is no such thing as too much
speech.
"A healthy democratic system can survive
the legislative power to prescribe how much politiT21
speech is too much, who may speak( and who may not."
Yet he differs from Black since he accepts the
compelling state interest test.
And it is in this
part of his opinion that he is particularly disdainful
of the Court's analysis.
Scalia simply sees no
legitimate state interest. He sardonically questions
the majority's argument of corporate wealth being
used to corrupt the political process.
Does one
"think it would be lawful to prohibit men and women
whose. net worth is above a ?f.ftain figure from
endorsing political candidates'?"
The mere fact
of corporate wealth appears to be irrelevant to Scalia
as far as First Amendment protection is concerned.
"The advocacy of such entities •••• that have 'amassed
great wealth' will be effective only to the extent
that it brings to the people's attention ideas while
- despite the invariably self-interested and probably
uncongenial source - strike them as true ... 14
The threat that the State of Michigan and the
majority of the Court perceive in economic power
having a negative impact on political debate is simply
not supported by the philosophy of the First
Amendment.
Scalia is saying that the mere wealth
of the speaker be it individual or corporation, is
no basis for the compelling state interest test.
"It is rudimentary that the state cannot exact as
the price of special advantage (the corporate 1
the forfeiture of First Amendment rights."
As
to the .question of
whether corporations
could
"corrode" the political process by their use of funds,
the Justice accuses the Court of equating corruption
with unpopularity, with fear of the potential wrong
to American society from powerful economic units
taking direct part in the political debate •••••
For the first time since Justice Holmes left the
bench 1 the court holds that a direct restriction
upon speech is narrowly enough tailored if it extends
to speech
has the mere potential for producing
social harm."
Speech operates in a competitive
setting and in this free-for-all environment, values
and ideas which survive have passed a severe test.
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Fairness, or merit, or equity are not necessarily
part of the rules. There seems to be no difference
between the weal thy individual
and the modern
corporation. Nor is there an assumption that wealth
in and of i tself should be considered as adversely
affecting political debate.
If wealth equals power
so be it.
That is part · of our free system of
government. "Under the court's analysis of corruption
by immense aggregation of wealth virtually any thing
the court dee ms politically undesirable can be turned
into political corruption
by simply describing
its effects as politically "corrosive" which is close
enough to corruption to qualify.
It is sad to think
that the First Amendment will ultimately be
down not by brute force but by poetic metaphor."
It is anathema to Scalia to calibrate political
speech to the degree of public opinion that supports
it. What particularly annoyed Scalia was the general
prohibition of corporate free speech activity by
Michigan
a nd
not
merely
limiting
independent
expenditures above a certain amount or some other
specific guide lines as long as the guidelines were
reasonable and content neutral.
As an example, in
the case of Ward v Rock 105 L.Ed.2, 661, Scalia joined
the maj ority which held that New York City's law
requiring sponsors of park bandshell concerts to
use
sound
amplification equipment and sound
technicians provided by the City was valid under
t he F i rst Amendment as a reasonable regulation of
place and manner of speech.
The Michigan statute
was not reasonable, was not narrowly tailored, because
its rationale was the economic power of speech and
thus it was aimed at the thought and content itself.
conclusion
Scalia's position in Johnson and Eichman, appears
to be consistent with his overall philosophy of
constitutional interpretation.
Once he acepted flag
burning as expressive conduct, once he determi ned
that there was no breach Of the peace, Scalia sough t
the text and found protection for Johnson and Eichman.
While the e mphasis in Austin was on speech in its
traditional sense
(rational political discourse),
Scalia was able to make the leap to find the extreme
conduct of flag burning minus concurrent violence,
as political expression and, thus protected.
As
abhorrent as the act was the Constitution shields
it from attack by the State.
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